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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The bulk of the public opinion research on immigration identifies the factors leading to opposition 
to immigration.  In contrast, we focus on a previously unexplored factor yielding support for 
immigration: humanitarianism. Relying upon secondary analysis of national survey data and an 
original survey experiment, we demonstrate that humanitarian concern significantly decreases 
support for restrictive immigration policy. Results from our survey experiment demonstrate that in 
an information environment evoking both threat and countervailing humanitarian concern regarding 
immigration, the latter can and does override the former.  Last, our results point to the importance 
of individual differences in empathy in moderating the effects of both threat and humanitarian 
inducements.   
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Within the public opinion research on immigration, there is a distinct asymmetry with 
respect to the way scholarship has approached understanding the factors that shape mass attitudes³
the research questions pursued are overwhelmingly framed in the negative: Why citizens dislike, are 
threatened by, and ultimately oppose immigration. The literature is replete with work addressing 
prejudice toward immigrant minorities1, the personality traits from which this prejudice stems2, the 
existence and impact of different types of threats posed by immigrants3, studies focusing on  public 
support for specific restrictive or ethno-nativist immigration policies4, and the importance of the 
media in shaping opposition to immigration5.  
Within all of this work there is little to no research examining the factors that lead people to 
be supportive of immigrants. Few published studies explicitly seek to explain pro-immigrant 
sentiment6, and one of the only individual-level factors consistently identified throughout the 
opinion literature to weaken opposition to immigration is education7. If anything, the question is left 
to be answered primarily by implication through inverting known findings; in others words, if 
opposition is predicted by prejudice, threat, and authoritarianism, for example, then support for 
immigration should exist among non-prejudiced, unthreatened, and non-authoritarian individuals.  
Inverting known findings, however, provides at best, an incomplete account for understanding or 
predicting pro-immigrant sentiment. To be sure, identifying the relative absence of factors known to 
boost opposition to immigration  is not synonymous with, and thus does not diminish the predictive 
importance of, identifying the factors, if present, that yield support for immigrants.  Even intergroup 
                                                 
1 Burns and Gimpel 2000; Quillian 1995; Stephan et al. 1999. 
2 Guimond et al. 2010; Hetherington and Wieler 2009; Thomsen et al. 2008. 
3 Citrin et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1997; Sniderman et al. 2004; Stephan et al. 2005. 
4 Campbell et al. 2006; Citrin et al. 1990b; Hood and Morris 2000; Tolbert and Grummel 2003. 
5 Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Chavez 2008; Hopkins 2010; Waldman et al. 2008. 
6 cf., Haubert and Fussell 2006. 
7 Burns and Gimpel 2000; Haubert and Fussell 2006; Fetzer 2000. 
2 
 
contact, which has been shown to reduce antipathy toward immigrant minorities8, is primarily 
theorized as an experiential factor connected to the varying situations of individuals (e.g., the density 
of immigrants in their residential context, the degree of workplace contact, etc.) rather than as an 
inherent characteristic of individuals (e.g., values or personality traits) that generates support for 
immigrants. In short, scholars have spent considerably more time informing us about the negative 
aspects of individual citizens that foster hostility toward immigrants and much less time theorizing 
and empirically exploring the range of positive characteristics, values, or capacities that promote 
support for immigration.    
More importantly, the asymmetry in the opinion research is out of synch with the actual 
political battlefield over immigration, where historically and at present, there exist myriad pro-
immigrant groups.  In attempting to identify the sources of support for immigration, one need only 
look to the principles and messages of these groups. In sifting through the mission statements of 
many pro-immigrant organizations, there tends to be two common and preponderant themes that 
arise: Human rights and humanitarian concern.  For instance, the American Friends Service 
Committee (AFSC), a religiously-based social justice, peace, and humanitarian service organization 
founded in 1917, has long provided aid and relief to immigrants from countries around the world. 
:KHQLWFRPHVWRFRQWHPSRUDU\86LPPLJUDWLRQSROLF\WKH$)6&DGYRFDWHV´KXPDQHO\UHIRUPLQJ
immigration polic\µ a position founded by their religiously-EDVHGEHOLHILQWKH´ZRUWKRIHYHU\
human-being,µas well as their organizational commitment to ZRUNLQJWRZDUGWKH´IDLUDQGKXPDQH
treatment of all people, including immigrants.µ9 The values of the AFSC are echoed by the 
Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee Interest Coalition (MIRA), the largest immigrant rights 
organization in New England, which advocates for the reform of state and federal immigration laws 
                                                 
8 Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; Hood and Morris 1997; Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000; Van Laar, Levin, Sinclair, and 
Sidanius 2005. 
9 http://afsc.org/ 
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toward more permissive policies aimed at upholding human rights.  MIRA, for example, advocates 
for decreasing the severity and intensity of immigration and customs enforcement, as well as 
LQFUHDVLQJLPPLJUDQWV·HOLJLELOLW\DQGaccess to government services. In the battlefield over 
immigration policy, where anti-immigrant organizations argue for more restrictive policies often 
based upon notions of patriotism, nativism, or xenophobia, there are many pro-immigrant groups 
acting on behalf of concern for the welfare of others and the protection of their basic human rights. 
Thus, while immigration-related threat is a core impetus for anti-immigrant organizing and action, 
humanitarianism appears to be a common and powerful motivating force among those taking action 
on behalf of immigrants. 
In this article, we seek to assess the impact of humanitarianism as a core pro-social 
orientation on public preferences over government immigration policy. First and foremost, using 
national survey data from 1996 and 2005, we test whether individual-level variation in concern over 
the welfare of others and a sense of duty to help those less well-off than oneself significantly reduces 
general opposition to immigration.  Next, we replicate these secondary analyses with original survey 
data. Given the importance of media information in generating public concern over immigration, 
specifically in regards to the threats of immigration10, we seek to assess, beyond extant individual 
differences in humanitarianism, whether media messages activating humanitarian concerns can 
generate permissiveness on immigration policies. More specifically, we aim to determine whether 
media information generating humanitarian concern can counteract or even override the effect of 
the more common threat-based messages found in media discourse. Utilizing an original survey 
experiment, we investigate whether exposure to information detailing the tribulations of an 
immigrant group in their home country enhances support for opening the border and allowing legal 
immigrants to enter the country.  Last, we determine whether individual variation in empathy for 
                                                 
10 Chavez 2008; Waldman et al. 2008. 
4 
 
others conditions the responsiveness of citizens to information intended to activate humanitarian 
concern for immigrants.  
HUMANITARIANISM AND IMMIGRATION 
The immigration-threat framework that dominates the literature has undeniably enriched our 
understanding of the beliefs, personality traits, and contextual factors that enhance opposition to 
immigration. Despite this contribution, the threat framework appears insufficient as a 
comprehensive account of opinion on immigration given levels of support for immigration that exist 
among the mass publics. For example, on the most basic policy issue in which American citizenV· 
preferences are routinely solicited³determining the amount of legal immigration allowed by the 
government³a national poll conducted by Gallup in the summer of 2012 revealed that 21 percent 
of the public favored increasing the amount of legal immigration, 42 percent preferred keeping 
levels at their current amount, and only 35 percent wanted to decrease legal immigration.11 Thus, 
despite VRPHFLWL]HQV· opposition to immigration, a majority of Americans do not appear to be 
overtly anti-immigrant, and a sizable group of people go out of their way to support immigration by 
endorsing an increase in the number of immigrants permitted to enter the U.S.   
To compliment the threat perspective, we offer a values-based approach that emphasizes the 
role of humanitarian concern in generating support for immigration. Humanitarianism has been 
GHILQHGDVD´SUR-social orientaWLRQµwhich varies across individuals, consists of a sense of concern 
for the welfare of RQH·VIHOORZKXPDQEHLQJVDQGOHDGVWRthe belief of personal responsibility to 
help those who are in need12.  The relevance of humanitarianism to public preferences over 
government policy has been firmly established within the domain of social welfare policy, as existing 
research demonstrates that individual variation in concern for the well-being of others strongly 
                                                 
11 This poll can be accessed at the following website: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx. 
12 Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Staub 1989. 
5 
 
predicts support for government spending on social programs and services13, government programs 
specifically aimed at providing support to disadvantaged citizens in need of immediate relief14, and 
old-age programs for the elderly15. Building upon this work, we argue that humanitarianism should 
constitute an important foundation for shaping public opinion toward immigration policy. The 
principle basis for this extension, and thus the main source of the amenability of public preferences 
within the immigration policy domain to humanitarian concern, is that disadvantage and need tend 
to (1) underlie migration processes and (2) characterize immigrants as a general social category.  
Historically and contemporaneously, a predominant motive among those seeking entry into 
the U.S. and other Western industrial democracies is the evasion of some set of undesirable 
FRQGLWLRQVLQWKHLUFRXQWU\RIRULJLQ7KHVHFRQGLWLRQVFRQFHSWXDOL]HGDV´SXVKIDFWRUVµGULYLQJ
immigrants away from their home country16, may range from relatively poor access to education and 
gainful employment, which restrict opportunities for economic mobility, to more extreme 
degradations such as acute poverty, pervasive crime, and severe political repression. At present, the 
majority of immigrants into advanced industrial nations are from countries that are underdeveloped 
relative to these target host nations, where several of these push factors are operative in motivating 
the exodus of citizens. Therefore, at the outset, many individuals seeking entry into the U.S. and 
Western Europe tend to qualify as targets for the application of humanitarian concern given the 
moderate to acute state of need existing in their home countries, and thus their general disadvantage 
relative to the average citizen in these host nations.  
With this in mind, we believe humanitarian concern should help shape mass preferences 
relating to the amount of legal immigration allowed in the county by the government. Indeed, the 
determination of the amount of legal immigration is not only one of the most general policies for 
                                                 
13 Malka, Soto, Cohen, and Miller 2011. 
14 Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Feldman and Zaller 1992. 
15 Huddy, Jones, and Chard 2001.  
16 Cornelius and Rosenbaum 2005. 
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which citizens can clearly assume a permissive to restrictive position, but it is also the most analyzed 
policy dependent variable in the opinion research on immigration17. Prior research informs us of the 
factors stimulating support for restricting our borders; here, we argue that rejecting the restriction of 
our borders in favor of sustaining or increasing current levels of immigration may reflect the 
expression of humanitarian motives and concerns.  Expressing support for a policy of permitting 
relatively disadvantaged individuals residing in less well-RIIFRXQWULHVWRHQWHURQH·VFRXQWU\ and 
potentially prosper constitutes a general position regarding immigration that embodies concern for 
the welfare of other human beings that are less well-off than oneself and the resulting motive to help 
those in need.  Accordingly, we hypothesize that individuals higher in humanitarianism should be more 
permissive with respect to the amount of legal immigrants entering the country and thus less likely to support a policy of 
restricting our borders (H1). 
Humanitarian Concern, Threat, and the Information Environment 
 Moving beyond individual-level differences in humanitarianism, there are forces operating in 
FLWL]HQV·HQYLURQPHQWs, such as media messages and information, which presumably have the 
capacity to generate humanitarian concern pertaining to immigration. For example, media discourse 
on immigration in the U.S. is replete with messages about the economic, national security, and 
cultural threats of immigration18, and research demonstrates that such messages are effective in 
generating support for restrictive immigration policies19. However, media messages may also activate 
humanitarian concern by focusing on the difficult conditions faced by many immigrants in their 
home countries, such as natural disasters, poverty, crime, political repression and violence, and the 
general absence of educational and economic opportunities.  
                                                 
17 e.g., Burns and Gimpel 2000; Brader et al. 2008; Citrin et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1997. 
18 Chavez 2008; Waldman et al. 2008. 
19 Brader et al. 2008; Sniderman et al. 2004; Stephan et al. 2005. 
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For example, public debate among nations in the Western Hemisphere over whether to 
grant temporary residence to tens of thousands of Haitians displaced by the massive earthquake that 
struck the country in January of 2010 focused heavily on the material devastation and humanitarian 
disaster caused by the earthquake20. One question of substantive interest emerging from such crises 
that currently remains empirically unexplored is whether providing information about the trials and 
tribulations faced by immigrants in their home countries is effective in bolstering support for 
permissive policies. In theory, such media messages may influence policy preferences by providing 
information about the deservingness21 of immigrants, and by priming22 concern for the welfare of 
others and activating the associated motive to help those in need. By activating humanitarian 
considerations for immigrants, media messages should enhance immigration policy permissiveness 
among the mass public, specifically with respect to levels of support for opening our borders to 
individuals attempting to flee harsh living conditions. Formally stated, we hypothesize that messages 
evoking humanitarian concern³for example, exposure to information about negative conditions faced by immigrants 
in their home countries³should cause citizens to favor more permissive government policies concerning the amount of 
legal immigration into the country (H2A).   
One reality of the political information environment in which citizens are exposed is the 
presence of countervailing information on any one policy issue. For example, in the welfare policy 
domain, the widespread diffusion of countervailing values throughout American political culture has 
resulted in considerable ambivalence among the mass public with respect to the social welfare 
state23. When it comes to media discourse on immigration, how will citizens react to a media 
environment with mixed messages, that is, to information activating both threat and humanitarian 
considerations? Extant work on media framing suggests a neutralization effect may occur when 
                                                 
20 Dinan 2010; Gentile 2010. 
21 Peterson, Slothuus, Stubager, and Togeby 2010. 
22 Iyengar and Kinder 1987. 
23 Feldman and Zaller 1992. 
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citizens find themselves in the midst of cross-cutting information regarding specific electoral or 
policy choices24. Thus, we hypothesize that information about the negative conditions faced by immigrants in 
their home countries will counteract, or neutralize, the effect of threatening information (H2B).  
Empathy and the Effect of Information  
 One last matter to consider is potential heterogeneity across individuals that could serve to 
moderate the effects of media messages aimed at generating humanitarian concern for the welfare of 
immigrants. One individual difference that should be relevant is the degree to which information 
describing the experiences of others³such as the hardships they face³has an emotional impact on 
the recipient.  Extant research on empathy reveals that individuals differ in their natural capacity to 
(1) FRJQLWLYHO\HQYLVLRQWKHPVHOYHVLQRWKHUV·FLUFXPVWDQFHVDQG(2) experience a vicarious emotional 
reaction25.  In the present case, the effect of a humanitarian inducement³incarnate by information 
about the trials and tribulations faced by immigrants in their home countries³may be most effective 
among citizens possessing higher levels of empathy. Citizens higher in empathy should be more 
likely to generate mental scripts involving themselves in the situations experienced by immigrants, as 
conveyed by media information, and to feel a negative emotional reaction as a result. Extant 
research on empathy indicates that one main consequence of possessing a greater capacity to 
empathize with others is a greater tendency to take action to help those in need26. While the work on 
empathy has not seen much application to political behavior, one study on the Second Gulf War 
found that individuals higher in empathy were more supportive of a variety of humanitarian actions 
intended to enhance the welfare of the Iraqi people27.  In view of this work, we hypothesize that 
individual differences in empathy should moderate the effect of media information inducing humanitarian concern, such 
                                                 
24 Chong and Druckman 2007; Sniderman and Theriault 2004. 
25 Baron-Cohen 2011; Dymond 1949; Mehrabian and Epstein 1972; Stotland 1969. 
26 Batson 1998; Batson, Chang, Orr, and Rowland 2002. 
27 Pagano and Huo 2007. 
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that the effects of this information on policy preferences will be the most operative among citizens highest in empathy 
(H3).  
OVERVIEW OF DATA AND METHODS 
 
 To test our hypotheses, we rely upon three datasets. In Study 1, we utilize a nationally 
representative survey conducted in the U.S. in 1996 to assess the effect of individual differences in 
humanitarianism on the preferred amount of legal immigration. In Study 2, we assess the robustness 
of the results from Study 1 by analyzing a nationally representative survey conducted in the U.S. 
nearly a decade later, in 2005.  In Study 3, we embedded an experiment into a 2012 U.S. statewide 
primary election survey conducted in North Carolina, in which respondents were exposed to one of 
four fabricated news stories about a federal plan to allow a group of Hondurans to immigrate to the 
state. The primary manipulation concerned whether respondents viewed a story containing 
information inducing threat or humanitarian concerns, or both simultaneously. This survey 
experiment allowed us to assess the causal effects of threat and humanitarian inducements on 
UHVSRQGHQWV·SROLF\SUHIHUHQFHVas well as analyze whether the effects of such media messages are 
conditioned by individual-level variation in empathy. Additionally, the control condition of this 
survey experiment afforded us the opportunity to assess whether the results found for data collected 
in 1996 (Study 1) and 2005 (Study 2) hold when using data collected in 2012.  
STUDY 1: THE 1996 ANES POST-ELECTION SURVEY 
 To provide an initial test of H1, we utilize the American National Election Studies (ANES) 
1996 Post-Election Study. This survey, conducted from November through December of 1996, is 
comprised of 1,534 face-to-face and telephone interviews of adult Americans throughout the 
contiguous U.S.  Of the 1,534 survey respondents, 1,210 identified their race as non-Hispanic, 
White. In keeping with prior opinion research on immigration aimed at assessing the dynamics of 
10 
 
opinion among the Anglo majority toward immigrant minorities28, the present analysis is restricted 
to these White respondents29. 
 To measure humanitarianism, we rely upon a scale constructed from four items included in 
the 1996 post-election study that originally appeared in the 1995 ANES Pilot Study. This four item 
scale (Į=.60), labeled Humanitarianism, represents a short-form of the 8 item scale from the 1995 
Pilot Study demonstrated to be a valid and reliable measure of individual differences in 
humanitarianism30.  As an example, one of the four items comprising our scale asked respondents to 
report WKHLUOHYHORIDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHVWDWHPHQW´One should always find ways to help others less 
IRUWXQDWHWKDQRQHVHOIµ The response options for this and the other items ranged from (1)-´DJUHH
VWURQJO\µWR-´GLVDJUHHVWURQJO\µ2XUHumanitarianism scale was constructed to range from low to 
high humanitarianism, and recoded to range from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation. The mean of the 
scale was .70, indicating considerable support for humanitarianism³a descriptive result found with 
other data in past research31. For more information about question wording for the items in our 
scale see Supplemental Appendix A.  
 The primary policy dependent variable for this analysis, labeled Amount of Immigration, is a 
standard item asking respondents to report their preferred level of immigration permitted into the 
FRXQWU\0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\UHVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHG´6KRXOGWKHQXPEHURILPPLJUDQWVIURPIRUHLJQ
countries permitted to come to the U.S. to live be (1) increased a lot, (2) increased a little, (3) left the 
same as it is now, (4) decreased a liWWOHRUGHFUHDVHGDORW"µ7KLVLWHPKDVDPHDQRIDQG
standard deviation of .92, indicating a preference among the average white respondent in this survey 
                                                 
28 Brader et al. 2008; Campbell et al. 2006; Citrin et al. 1990; Hood and Morris 1997; Rocha and Espino 2009; Stein et al. 
2000; Tolbert and Grummel 2003. 
29 In addition to being consistent with prior research, extant research suggests that different theoretical models³than 
those developed to explain national majority group reactions to immigrant minorities³may be appropriate for 
explaining the dynamics of opinion on immigration among immigrants and other minority groups (e.g., Hainmueller and 
Hopkins 2014; Dancygier and Saunder 2006; McClain et al. 2011; Nteta 2013).  
30 Steenbergen 1995. 
31 Feldman and Steenbergen 2001. 
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for immigration to be decreased.  Indeed, while only 4.4 percent of respondents preferred 
immigration be increased in any way, 58 percent preferred a moderate to severe decrease in the level 
of immigration into the country. Despite this clear restrictionist leaning among white Americans at 
the time of data collection, 37.6 percent preferred immigration be kept at its present levels, 
indicating that, while not supporting immigration by endorsing permissive policy, a large segment of 
the American public failed to signal any pronounced opposition to immigration.   
 In addition to this core policy item of interest, the 1996 ANES also contained an item 
tapping preferences toward government policy and the eligibility of immigrants for government 
VHUYLFHV5HVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHG´Do you think that immigrants who come to the U.S. should be 
eligible as soon as they come here for government services such as Medicaid, Food Stamps, Welfare, 
or should they have to be here a year or more?µ)URPWKLVLWHP, we created a dichotomous variable, 
labeled Delay Welfare Benefits, and FRGHG´µIRUUHVSRQGHQW
VSUHIHUULQJthe more restrictive position 
of making immigrants wait one \HDUIRUEHQHILWVDQG´µIRUWKRVHSUHIHUULQJWRPDNHLPPLJUDQWV
immediately eligible for services. This item has been used in prior opinion research on immigration32 
and provides an opportunity to assess whether the hypothesized effect of humanitarianism on 
preferences over the amount of immigrants permitted to enter the country extends beyond the 
border to a policy aimed at providing support to immigrants once residing within the country.  
 Our analysis included a variety of relevant control variables.  First, we sought to ensure that 
the observed effect of our measure of humanitarianism was not capturing other potentially related 
constructs, such as egalitarianism or political ideology.  Thus, we included a measure of both in our 
analysis.  Egalitarianism was measured using LWHPVWDSSLQJUHVSRQGHQWV·general level of support for 
the principle of equality, as well as support for active efforts by government to rectify existing social 
and economic inequalities in society. For example, one of the five items in the scale asked 
                                                 
32 Citrin et al. 1997; Newman, Hartman, and Taber 2012.  
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UHVSRQGHQWVWKHLUOHYHORIDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHVWDWHPHQW´2XUVRFLHW\VKRXOGGRZKDWHYHULV
necessary to make suUHWKDWHYHU\RQHKDVDQHTXDORSSRUWXQLW\WRVXFFHHGµResponse options for 
these items ranged from (1)-´$JUHH6WURQJO\µWR-´'LVDJUHH6WURQJO\µ:KHQFRPELQHGWKHVH
items formed a reliable scale (Į=.68), that was reverse coded to range from low to high levels of 
egalitarianism. Consistent with prior research33, this egalitarianism measure is only weakly correlated 
with humanitarianism (r=.24). Thus, we can be reasonably sure that these two items are empirically 
distinct, and that the inclusion of both in our analysis will enable us to observe the effect of concern 
for the welfare of others on immigration policy attitudes after controlling for general beliefs about 
how equitably resources should be distributed in society. Next, we included a control for liberal-
conservative ideological self-identification, labeled Ideology, by using an item asking respondents to 
place themselves on an 7 point scale ranging from (1)-´H[WUHPHO\/LEHUDOµWR)-´H[WUHPHO\
&RQVHUYDWLYHµ7KHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQKXPDnitarianism and ideology is -.09, indicating that our 
measure of concern for the welfare of others is empirically distinct from political ideology. As found 
in past research34, we find that egalitarianism is negatively correlated with ideology (r=-.41), such that 
liberals are more likely than conservatives to support a more equal distribution of income 
throughout society.  
 In addition to these two core controls, we also included standard controls for Education, 
Gender (1=male), Age, and partisanship, labeled Party ID (standard 7-point scale, 7=strong 
Republican). To control for the potential effects of personal economic concerns on preferences over 
immigration, we included controls for individual Income, Unemployment (1=unemployed), and 
Pocketbook Evaluations (high=experiencing financial distress). Beyond these standard controls, two 
additional individual-level factors of theoretical importance were included in our analysis. Prejudice 
toward ethnic minorities is a demonstrated predictor of opinion on immigration among citizens 
                                                 
33 e.g., Feldman and Steenbergen 2001. 
34 e.g., Feldman and Steenbergen 2001. 
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across a range of immigrant-receiving nations35. Given that Hispanic immigrants are the largest, 
fastest growing, and most politically salient immigrant group in the U.S., our analysis included a 
continuous measure of general negative affect toward Hispanics, labeled Hispanic Affect. This variable 
was coded to range from low to high negative feelings toward Hispanics. Second, our analysis 
included a control for the frequency of religious attendance to ensure that our humanitarianism 
measure is not simply picking up the effects of religiosity. For ease of interpretation, all variables 
were recoded to range from 0 to 1. For more information about variable measurement and question 
wording, please see Supplemental Appendix A.  
Results 
 Given the ordinal nature of our primary dependent variable, we used an ordered logistic 
regression model to estimate the effect of humanitarianism on preferences over the amount of 
immigration into the U.S.  To assess the effect of humanitarianism on preferences over the delay of 
government benefits to immigrants, we estimated a logistic regression model.  The results from 
these models are presented in Table 1. Beginning with our core model concerning the Amount of 
Immigration, the results reveal, as hypothesized, that an increase in humanitarianism is associated with 
a significant decrease in support for restricting the amount of legal immigration into the country (B= 
-.75, SE=.36, p<.05). In other words, citizens who are more concerned about the welfare of 
RWKHUVȥSDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHZKRDUHOHVVIRUWXQDWHWKDQWKHPVHOYHVȥare significantly more permissive 
on immigration, as indicated by the decrease in their probability of endorsing a government policy of 
greatly reducing  the amount of immigration. The magnitude of the effect of humanitarianism is 
provided in the bottom row of Table 1; as listed, moving from minimum to maximum levels of 
humanitarianism is associated with a .16 decrease in the probability of endorsing the most restrictive 
                                                 
35 Citrin et al. 1997; Huddy and Sears 1995. 
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policy position with respect to the amount of immigration.  Thus, in addition to being statistically 
significant, the effect of humanitarianism is substantively meaningful.   
 In addition to reducing opposition to immigration at the border, the results in column 2 of 
Table 1 reveal that humanitarianism also reduces support for policies aimed at restricting the access 
of immigrants already residing within the country to vital government services. Indeed, an increase 
in humanitarianism is associated with a significant decrease (B=-2.56, SE=.70, p<.01 in the 
probability of favoring a policy of making immigrants wait one year to become eligible to receive 
government services. In addition to being highly significant, this effect is also substantively 
comparable in size to its impact on preferences over the amount of immigration, as moving from 
minimum to maximum levels of humanitarianism is associated with nearly a .15 decrease in the 
probability of denying immigrants immediate access to government services and welfare.   
 Turning to the controls in the Amount of Immigration model, we find that educated citizens 
and those scoring higher on egalitarianism were significantly less opposed to immigration, while 
those very concerned about their personal finances and reporting higher levels of prejudice toward 
Hispanics36 were more likely to favor a reduction in the amount of immigration into the U.S. Within 
the Delay Welfare Benefits model, the only control to emerge significant was egalitarianism, with those 
scoring higher in egalitarianism significantly more opposed to denying immigrants immediate access 
to government services. One issue worth addressing is the possibility that the impact of 
humanitarianism varies across political orientations and prejudice, such that the effects we observe 
in Table 1 are attenuated among Republican, conservative, or prejudiced citizens. In estimating 
auxiliary moderated regression models including interaction terms between humanitarianism and 
partisanship, ideology, and prejudice, no significant interactions emerged between our measure of 
                                                 
36 Given potential reciprocal causality between immigration policy preferences and prejudice toward Hispanics, we 
should note that the results for humanitarianism completely hold (in both Study 1 and Study 2) when excluding our 
measure of prejudice from our models. 
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humanitarianism and partisanship, ideology, or prejudice toward Hispanics for either dependent 
variable. That is, our analyses indicate that possessing high levels of concern for the welfare of 
others translates into heightened permissiveness toward immigrants for Democrats and Republicans, 
liberals and conservatives, and the prejudiced and unprejudiced alike37.   
 The results presented above provide initial support for our humanitarianism hypothesis. 
More specifically, the findings from Study 1 demonstrate that citizens who are more concerned 
about the welfare of others, holding constant a range of competing factors, are much less likely to 
oppose immigration and more likely instead to support immigrants by endorsing a policy of keeping 
the natiRQ·VERUGHUV open. Additionally, Study 1 demonstrates that the permissive benefit provided 
to immigrants by humanitarianism extended beyond the border to policy impacting the welfare of 
immigrants once within the country, as citizens scoring higher in humanitarian concern were more 
likely to support a policy of making immigrants immediately eligible for receiving needed 
government services. Given that Study 1 relies upon data collected in 1996, we wanted to assess the 
robustness of the effect of humanitarianism on immigration policy preferences over time. In the 
following study, we provide an additional test of our first hypothesis using representative survey data 
collected in 2005. 
STUDY 2: THE 2005 CID SURVEY 
 To provide a replication test for H1 using more recent data, we utilize the 2005 Citizenship, 
Involvement, Democracy Study (CID) conducted by the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at 
Georgetown University. This survey, fielded between May and July, 2005, is comprised of 1,001 
face-to-face interviews of adult Americans throughout the contiguous U.S.  The response rate for 
this survey, based upon a cluster-sample design, is 40 percent. Of the 1,001 survey respondents, 725 
                                                 
37 Given the potential for humanitarianism in serving as a "pre-political" value orientation influencing political 
orientations, we should note that our results for humanitarianism (across our three studies) completely hold when 
excluding party identification and ideology, as potentially mediating variables, from our models.   
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identified their race as non-Hispanic, White. Consistent with Study 1 and prior research, the present 
analysis is restricted to these White respondents. 
 To measure humanitarianism, we relied upon a survey item asking respondents to report 
KRZLPSRUWDQWWKH\EHOLHYHGLWWREHWR´VXSSRUWSHRSOHZKRDUHZRUVHRIIWKDQWKHPVHOYHV.µThis 
item strikes at the heart of the theoretical conceptualization of humanitarianism as a pro-social 
orientation consisting of the belief that one bears a personal responsibility to help others who are in 
need38.  Moreover, this question is comparable to items measuring humanitarianism from the 1995 
and 1996 ANES studies. The response options for this item range from (0)-´([WUHPHO\
8QLPSRUWDQWµWR-´([WUHPHO\,PSRUWDQWµ7KHPHDQIRUWKLVvariable, labeled Humanitarianism, 
is 7.2, with a standard deviation of 2.1, indicating considerable importance attributed to 
humanitarianism in the sample³a descriptive result consistent with that from the 1996 ANES and 
prior research. For ease of interpretation, Humanitarianism was recoded to range from 0 to 1. 
 Consistent with Study 1, we used respondents· preferences over the Amount of Immigration as 
the primary policy dependent variable for this analysis. Similar to the item from the 1996 ANES 
survey, respondents in the 2005 CID ZHUHDVNHG´6KRXOGWKHQXPEHURILPmigrants from foreign 
countries permitted to come to the U.S. to live be (1) increased a lot, (2) increased a little, (3) left the 
VDPHDVLWLVQRZGHFUHDVHGDOLWWOHRUGHFUHDVHGDORW"µ7ZRGHVFULSWLYHIindings for this 
item are consistent with the item from the 1996 ANES used in Study 1, and past research more 
generally39. First, when it comes to the most general issue of how many immigrants should be 
allowed to enter the U.S., as found in 1996, white Americans in 2005 leaned toward a restrictionist 
position, as the mean response to the CID question was 3.6 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5.  Second, 
despite this restrictionist leaning, the modal response (34.3 percent) among white respondents was 
to maintain the amount of immigrants admitted to the U.S. at its current levels.  Twenty-eight 
                                                 
38 Feldman and Steenbergen 2001. 
39 e.g., Hood and Morris 1997. 
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percent of Whites in our sample supported the most restrictive position of preferring immigration 
EH´GHFUHDVHGDORWµZKLOHRQO\DEout 13 percent reported preferring the amount of immigration be 
HLWKHU´LQFUHDVHGDOLWWOHµRU´LQFUHDVHGDORWµ 
 Our analysis included the same set of controls included in Study 1 with the addition of three 
theoretically relevant variables not available in the 1996 ANES. First, Egalitarianism was measured 
using respondents·UHSRUted level of agreement with the statement: ´7KHJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGWDNH
PHDVXUHVWRUHGXFHGLIIHUHQFHVLQLQFRPHOHYHOVµResponse options ranged from (1)-´$JUHH
6WURQJO\µWR-´'LVDJUHH6WURQJO\µFor clarity, we reverse coded this item from low to high 
support for reducing income inequality.  This measure of egalitarianism is roughly comparable in 
question wording to items from the NES used in prior research40, and consistent with past research 
and Study 1, egalitarianism is uncorrelated in the CID survey with humanitarianism (r=.06). Next, 
we control for Ideology with an item asking respondents to place themselves on an 11-point scale 
ranging from (0)-´H[WUHPHO\/LEHUDOµWR(10)-´H[WUHPHO\&RQVHUYDWLYHµThe correlation between 
humanitarianism and ideology is .01, indicating that, consistent with Study 1, our measure of 
humanitarianism is empirically distinct from political ideology. As found in Study 1, we find that our 
measure of egalitarianism in the CID is negatively correlated with ideology (r=-.19). 
 As was done in Study 1, we included standard controls for Education, Gender (1=male), Age, 
Party ID (standard 7-point scale, 7=strong Republican), Income, Unemployment (1=unemployed), 
Pocketbook Evaluations (high=experiencing financial distress), Hispanic Affect, and Religious Attendance. 
Beyond these standard controls, the CID included a measure of the strength of national identity, 
which has been found to be an important predictor of public opinion on immigration41. Therefore, 
our analysis included a measure of the strength of National Identity, coded to range from weak to 
strong attachment to American identity. In addition, research has demonstrated that personality 
                                                 
40 e.g., see Feldman 1988, 1999; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Kluegal and Smith 1986. 
41 Sides and Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004. 
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traits, such as authoritarianism, influences attitudes toward immigration42; given this, we include a 
control for Right Wing Authoritarianism. Last, intergroup contact theory suggests that having friends 
who are immigrants may reduce threat perceptions and increase support for permissive policy 
positions.  To control for this possibility, our analysis included a dichotomous measure³labeled 
Immigrant Friend & Family³which captures whether respondents report having any close friends 
who are recent immigrants (1=has immigrant friends/family). For ease of interpretation, all variables 
were recoded to range from 0 to 1. For more information about variable measurement and question 
wording, please see Supplemental Appendix B.  
Results 
The results from an ordered logistic regression analysis of the effect of humanitarianism on 
preferences over the amount of immigration into the U.S. are presented in Table 2. As hypothesized, 
and consistent with the results from Study 1, we find that an increase in humanitarianism is 
associated with a significant decrease in support for restricting the amount of legal immigration into 
the country (B= -.67, SE=.33, p<.05).  To be sure, citizens who find it important to support people 
who are worse off than themselves, compared to those who find it of lesser importance, are 
significantly less opposed to immigration.  The magnitude of the effect of humanitarianism is 
provided in the bottom row of Table 2, which reveals that moving from minimum to maximum 
levels of humanitarianism is associated with a .14 decrease in the probability of endorsing the most 
restrictive policy position with respect to the amount of immigration.  Thus, across two national 
surveys separated by nearly a decade, we find that the effects of humanitarianism are in the 
hypothesized direction, statistically significant, substantively meaningful, and strikingly comparable 
in effect size43. 
                                                 
42 Hetherington and Weiler 2009. 
43 While we are primarily interested in the impact of Humanitarianism on preferences over the Amount of Immigration, the 
2005 CID Survey contains three additional items gauging respondents' perceptions regarding the economic, cultural, and 
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 Turning to the controls, we find that, consistent with prior opinion research, educated 
citizens are significantly less opposed to immigration, while older adults, ideological conservatives, 
those very concerned about their personal finances, and those reporting higher levels of 
authoritarianism and prejudice toward Hispanics, are more likely to favor a reduction in the amount 
of immigration into the country. Additionally, consistent with null results found with the 1996 
ANES, in estimating auxiliary moderated regression models, we found no significant interactions 
between our measure of humanitarianism and partisanship, ideology, or prejudice toward Hispanics. 
Thus, as was the case with the 1996 ANES data, our auxiliary analyses using the CID data indicate 
that possessing high levels of humanitarian concern for others translates into heightened 
permissiveness toward immigration among Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, 
and the prejudiced and unprejudiced alike. Further, given the presence of a measure of the strength 
of national identity, we sought to ascertain whether national attachment moderates the impact of 
humanitarianism, such that those scoring higher in attachment may be less inclined to extend 
humanitarian concern toward outgroup members, such as immigrants.  Despite the theoretical 
plausibility of this possibility, we did not find a significant interaction between humanitarianism and 
national identity.   
The results presented thus far provide strong support for our humanitarianism hypothesis. 
In the study that follows, we seek to replicate these findings using original survey data collected in 
2012 from respondents living in North Carolina, a state in the U.S. that has seen large influxes of 
Hispanic immigrants over the past decade. We also embedded an original experiment within the 
survey which enabled us to test our remaining hypotheses concerning the effects of media messages 
                                                                                                                                                             
public safety impacts of immigration into the nation.  In estimating three additional regression models, we found that an 
increase in humanitarianism was associated with significant decreases in perceived economic, cultural, and crime threats 
related to immigration. For readers interested in viewing these results, see Supplemental Appendix C.   
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inducing threat and humanitarian concern on policy preferences, as well as the role of empathy in 
moderating the impact of such inducements.  
STUDY 3: THE 2012 NORTH CAROLINA PRIMARY ELECTION SURVEY 
EXPERIMENT  
 
We fielded our survey experiment roughly two weeks prior to the 2012 North Carolina 
Primary Election.44 To obscure the true nature of our study, respondents first answered a set of 
general questions about state politics such as their evaluations of the governor and state legislature, 
trust in state government, and attitudes toward local political issues. Next, respondents completed a 
series of items measuring three psychological constructs of interest, namely humanitarianism, 
empathy, and egalitarianism. Following these items, subjects were then randomly assigned to one of 
four experimental treatment conditions that involved reading a fabricated press release about a 
federal program to allow a group of Hondurans to immigrate to North Carolina. After exposure to 
the primary manipulation, respondents completed a post-treatment questionnaire measuring their 
attitudes toward various immigration policies, as well as some basic demographics. 
In terms of demographics, our North Carolina sample of 983 adults is relatively diverse. 45 
)RUH[DPSOHUHVSRQGHQWV·DJHVUDQJHGIURPWR\HDUVROGPHGLDQDJH \HDUVROGDQG
they reported living in 85 of the 100 counties within the state. Moreover, 34% of respondents 
identified themselves as Republicans, 37% as Independents, and 29% as Democrats. Ideologically, 
the sample consisted of 36% conservatives, 42% moderates, and 23% liberals. The median 
household income range of the sample is $50,000 to $75,000, with 39% of respondents indicating 
                                                 
44 Data were collected from April 27th to May 3rd, 2012, immediately before the NC Primary Election was held on May 
8th, 2012.  Respondents were recruited on the Internet by uSamp, a global provider of online market research panels. 
Recruiting from thousands of partners worldwide, uSamp boasts a panel of more than 9 million highly diverse 
respondents worldwide, with an average of more than 200,000 unique visitors to their consumer websites every day. 
Panelists are offered their choice of monetary incentives for their participation such as cash, gift cards, virtual currency, 
or charitable contributions. 
45 To ensure the quality of our data, we embedded a quality control question in the psychological item batteries to filter 
out bad data. Of the original 1,069 respondents that completed our online survey, 86 individuals (8% of the sample) did 
not answer the quality control question correctly, so they were dropped from further analyses. 
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that they had earned a 4-year college degree. The only apparent anomaly with our uSamp data is that 
the sample is skewed heavily toward female respondents (79%), which is likely a function of the 
websites from which uSamp recruits panelists. Eighty-six percent of the sample identified their race 
as non-Hispanic, White, and we will focus on this subsample for the remaining analyses. 
Replication of Studies 1 and 2 
 To replicate our findings from Studies 1 and 2, we analyzed the effects of individual 
differences in humanitarianism on immigration policy preferences for the 196 white respondents in 
the control condition of our survey experiment.46  We measured individual differences in 
humanitarianism using the 8-item scale from the 1995 ANES pilot study and also used by Feldman 
and Steenbergen (2001). From these items, we generated a scale, labeled Humanitarianism (Į=.80), 
coded so that high values reflect greater levels of this trait.  For more information about these 8 
items, see Supplemental Appendix D.   
Our primary dependent variable in the NC statewide survey is the standard Amount of 
Immigration item, which is coded so that the highest category indicates a preference for a reduction in 
the level of immigration. In addition to soliciting preferences on this item in order to conduct a 
replication test of the results from the 1996 ANES and 2005 CID, we asked respondents to report 
their preferences on two additional immigration policy issues. The first of these items, labeled Delay 
Welfare Benefits, parallels the item from Study 1 and gauges whether legal immigrants should be 
immediately eligible for statewide government services and programs or should have to wait 1 year 
or more. We coded this three-FDWHJRU\RUGLQDOLWHPVRWKDWWKHKLJKHVWYDOXH ´ZDLWPRUHWKDQ
\HDUµLQGLFDWHVDSUHIHUHQFHIRUJUHDWO\GHOD\LQJLHUHVWULFWLQJWKHDFFHVVRIOHJDOLPPLJUDQWVWR
government services. The second policy item asks respondents whether they favor or oppose 
                                                 
46 We chose to use respondents in the control condition of our survey experiment because these respondents essentially 
comprise a sub-sample of observational data and were not subjected to messages inducing threat or humanitarian 
concern. Thus, the use of those in the control condition enables us to perform an analysis of the effects of individual 
differences in humanitarianism on policy preferences devoid of any influence of exposure to different stimulus materials.  
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allowing the children of undocumented immigrants to attend public schools. This item, labeled 
Attend Public Schools, has 5 ordered response categories, ranging from (1)-´6WURQJO\6XSSRUWµWR-
´6WURQJO\2SSRVHµIn sum, our survey contained three unique immigration policy items, and each 
was coded so that higher values indicate a preference for restrictive policy.  
To analyze the effect of humanitarianism on preferences across these three items, we 
estimated ordered logistic regression models.  All models included controls for Egalitarianism, 
Education, Income, Age, Gender (1=male), Ideology (1=very conservative), and Party ID (1=strong 
Republican).  For ease of interpretation, all independent variables³except age³were recoded to 
range from 0 to 1. For more information about variable measurement and question wording, please 
see Supplemental Appendix D.  The results from these analyses are presented in Table 3. The first 
row of the table lists the effects of humanitarianism on each policy, and the bottom row lists the 
magnitude of the effect of humanitarianism on each policy in the form of the change in the 
probability of favoring the most restrictive position on each policy associated with a 1 unit change 
(i.e., moving from low to high levels) in humanitarianism.  
First and foremost, the results in column 1 of Table 3 corroborate the results from the 
ANES and CID surveys by revealing that an increase in humanitarianism is associated with a 
significant decrease in the probability of preferring to limit the number of legal immigrants allowed 
to enter the U.S.  However, compared to Studies 1 and 2, the effect size of humanitarianism is 
substantially larger, as moving from minimum to maximum levels of humanitarianism is associated 
with a .47 decrease in the probability of favoring a reduction in immigration. Thus, across three 
separate datasets spanning across 16 years, we find consistent support for our first hypothesis that 
individuals who are higher in humanitarianism will be less opposed to immigration and more 
supportive of retaining an open border. Further, in each of the three studies, particularly Study 3, we 
find that these effects are substantively meaningful. 
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The results in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 present the effects of humanitarianism on the two 
additional policy items. The results reveal that the permissive benefit provided by humanitarianism 
with respect to a policy concerning the entry of immigrants into the country extends to policies 
concerning the availability of government services to immigrants once residing within the country. 
Consistent with the finding from Study 1, the results in column 2 indicate that humanitarians are 
more likely to oppose making legal immigrants wait over a year to receive government services; 
instead, those high in humanitarianism are more likely to endorse more immediate eligibility for such 
services. In column 3, we see that those high in humanitarianism are also more likely to oppose a 
policy of barring the children of illegal immigrants from attending public schools. Further, the 
results in the bottom row of the table reveal that the magnitudes of these effects are quite large. 
Thus, when it comes to entry into the U.S. and access to government services, humanitarianism 
clearly provides a permissive benefit.  Interestingly, the largest effect of humanitarianism pertains to 
arguably one of the most vulnerable segments of the immigration population³the children of illegal 
immigrants.  When it comes to providing support to these children by allowing them access to 
public schools, humanitarianism drastically increases permissiveness.  
Results from the Survey-Embedded Experiment 
Having replicated the results from Studies 1 and 2, we now turn to our survey-embedded 
experiment, in which respondents were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions 
(information environment: control, threat, humanitarianism, and combined).  All subjects were 
SUHVHQWHGZLWKDIDEULFDWHGSUHVVUHOHDVHLQIRUPLQJWKHPWKDWWKH´86,Pmigration and Customs 
Enforcement Office has drafted a plan to begin allowing hundreds of Hondurans to immigrate to 
1RUWK&DUROLQDµIRUWKHH[DFWZRUGLQJRIDOOVWLPXOus materials, see Supplemental Appendix E).  
The four experimental conditions vary by the information that was presented following this 
information. In the threat condition, subjects read about a non-partisan report indicating that these 
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new immigrants will ´require a wide range of tax-payHUIXQGHGVWDWHVHUYLFHVµOLNHO\´increase 
competitioQIRUMREVµ´KDYHOLPLWHG(QJOLVK-language ability,µ and WKDW´take some time to fully 
assimilate into the U.Sµ Our threat manipulation was designed to tap two distinct dimensions of 
immigration-related thereat, namely realistic threats to the material well-being of the group47 and 
V\PEROLFWKUHDWVWRFLWL]HQV·YDOXHV, norms, and cultural identity48. Discussion of these types of threat 
pervade media discourse on immigration49, and reliance upon this type of information to 
experimentally induce threat over immigration has been demonstrated to be effective in prior 
research50. By contrast, subjects assigned to the humanitarianism condition read that the purpose of 
the immigration plan was to help thHVH+RQGXUDQVHVFDSH´harsh and unsafe conditions in their 
home FRXQWU\µVXFKDV ´SRYHUW\,µ ´limited access to employment,µ and ´JRYHUQPHQWUHSUHVVLRQµ
7REHFOHDURXULQWHQWLRQLQWKLVFRQGLWLRQZDVWRKLJKOLJKWWKHVWUXFWXUDOIRUFHV´WKUHDWHQ>LQJ@WKH
lives of many Honduransµ,QWKHFRPELQHGFRQGLWLRQZHLQFOXGHG both of the threat and 
humanitarianism scripts, which serve to simulate a mixed message media environment. Finally, the 
control condition contained a relatively antiseptic GHVFULSWLRQRI+RQGXUDV·FOLPDWHWHUUDLQDQG
natural resources. 
Following exposure to these stories, all respondents proceeded to complete the post-
treatment questionnaire. In addition to filtering out respondents with a quality control item, we 
filtered the data from the survey experiment EDVHGXSRQUHVSRQGHQWV·UHFRUGHGUHDGLQJVWLPHs in 
each condition. Using estimates based upon average reading rates, and what we believe to be 
reasonable reading times for each condition, we opted to filter 220 respondents or (21% of the 
                                                 
47 e.g., see Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Passel and Fix, 1994. 
48 Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior, 2004. 
49 Chavez 2008; Waldman et al. 2008. 
50 Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008. 
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sample) from the data.51 This filtering procedure ensures that we removed respondents who most 
likely did not read the assigned news passage, and thus did not receive the respective experimental 
treatment. The remaining sample used to evaluate the effects of our treatments contained 726 
respondents, of which we restrict our analyses to the 618 non-Hispanic Whites. 
7RDVVHVVWKHHIIHFWVRIRXUH[SHULPHQWDOWUHDWPHQWVRQUHVSRQGHQWV·LPPLJUDWLRQSROLF\
preferences, we created three dichotomous treatment dummy variables to correspond to being in 
either the threat, humanitarian, or combined condition, with the control condition serving as the 
baseline category of comparison.  To test our hypotheses concerning the effects of media 
LQIRUPDWLRQRQFLWL]HQV·LPPLJUDWLRQSROLF\DWWLWXGHVZHIRFXVRQUHVSRQGHQWV·SUHIHUHQFHVfor the 
Amount of Immigration, whose question wording and coding is described in the prior section. To test 
H3 pertaining to the potential role of individual differences in empathy in moderating the effect of 
our humanitarian treatment on policy preferences, we relied upon 5 items taken from the short-form 
of the empathy quotient52.  From these five items, we generated an Empathy scale (Į=.72), recoded 
from 0 to 1 and ranging from low to high levels of empathy. 
 Figure 1 (see also Table F1 in Supplemental Appendix F) displays the results from an 
RUGHUHGORJLVWLFUHJUHVVLRQRIVXEMHFWV·SUHIHUHQFHVfor the amount of immigration by experimental 
treatment condition. The results reveal that survey respondents who were exposed to threatening 
media messages about the material and cultural consequences of allowing Hondurans to immigrate 
                                                 
51 Research on adult reading rates suggests that the average person can read approximately 200 to 250 words per minute 
7D\ORU8VLQJWKHVHVSHHGVDVDEDVHOLQHZHHVWLPDWHGWKDW´VORZµUHDGHUVZRXOGEHDEOHWRUHDGDWOHDVW
words per minute (or half of the 200-ZRUGDYHUDJHZKLOH´IDVWµUHDGHUVZRXOGEHDEOHWRUHDGQRPRUHWKDQZRUGV
per minute (or double the 250-word average). We acknowledge that these figures are somewhat arbitrary cutoffs; yet, we 
felt that the benefits of removing non-attendant subjects outweighed the exclusion of a few exceptionally fast or slow 
readers from our analyses. Thus, based upon the word length of each experimental condition, our cutoffs were as 
follows: 1) Threat (136 words): 16 to 82 seconds; 2) Humanitarianism (151 words): 18 to 91 seconds; 3) Combined: 28 to 
151 seconds; and 4) Control: 10 to 54 seconds. One way to check whether these estimates are accurate is to compare the 
expected with the observed (median) reading rates for each condition (using 250 words per minute as the baseline): 1) 
Threat: 33 vs. 35 seconds; 2) Humanitarianism: 36 vs. 35 seconds; 3) Combined: 56 vs. 54 seconds; and 4) Control: 22 
vs. 29 seconds. By all accounts, our estimates seem very close to the actual median reading rates in the data. 
52 Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004; Wakabayashi et al. 2006. 
26 
 
to North Carolina were significantly more likely to prefer a reduction in the amount of immigration 
(B=.35, SE=.23, p<.10) than those in the control condition. This finding is entirely in keeping with 
prior research in the opinion literature on immigration, where induced economic and cultural threats 
were found to generate opposition to immigration53. Consistent with H2A, the results also reveal 
that subjects receiving the humanitarian treatment, compared to those in the control, were 
significantly less likely to support a restrictive policy of reducing the amount of immigration (B= -
.48, SE=.22, p<.05).  And last, the results reveal that subjects receiving both treatments were also 
significantly less likely (B= -.39, SE=.22, p<.05) than those in the control to prefer restricting the 
amount of immigration. This last finding is particularly interesting given that we expected a 
neutralization effect (i.e., H2B), as prior research suggested that countervailing information tends to 
cancel each other out. Rather, we find that receiving information about the hardships faced by 
immigrants actually increased permissiveness even in the presence of threatening media information about 
immigrants. 
One thing to note from the figure is that the effect of our humanitarian treatment, 
directionality aside, is roughly 20 percent larger than that of our threat treatment. Given this, it 
makes some sense that receiving both messages in the combined condition would still lead to an 
overall reduction in restrictiveness. Yet, these differences in effect sizes beg the question: Are the 
differences in effects we observe due to humanitarianism being a stronger force in shaping opinion 
than threat, or because our threat manipulation was weak in stimulus design relative to our 
humanitarianism inducement, thus rendering our results an artifact of experimental design? To be 
sure, we view our threat treatment as a strong manipulation in that it was based upon, and is entirely 
comparable to, proven stimulus materials used in other immigration research54.  No obvious 
disparities stand out between our two treatments in terms of script length, as the two scripts are 
                                                 
53 Brader et al. 2008; Sniderman et al. 2004; Stephan et al. 2005. 
54 e.g., Brader et al. 2008; Stephan et al. 2005. 
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roughly equal in this regard. In short, we view our two treatments as roughly equal in strength and 
suspect that induced humanitarian concern may have produced larger effects due to the presence of 
a ´FHLOLQJHIIHFWµ55 for threat induction. Given the pervasiveness of threatening messages in media 
discourse about immigration, the public may already have these considerations present when 
thinking about their policy preferences. In contrast, humanitarian-oriented information is much less 
ubiquitous relative to threat; thus, our manipulation of humanitarian concerns may be more likely to 
activate new considerations not already present by default. 
So far, the results from our survey experiment reveal that media messages inducing 
humanitarian concern for immigrants, by conveying information about the hardships they face in 
their home countries, can increase permissiveness for policies about the amount of immigration, and 
that this effect, though slightly weakened, holds in the presence of information intended to activate 
economic and cultural threat from immigrants. Now, we consider the question of whether these 
W\SHVRIPHVVDJHVDERXWLPPLJUDWLRQUHVRQDWHZLWKFLWL]HQV·GLIIHUHQWO\GHSHQGLQJupon their ability 
to empathize with others. To assess whether individual differences in empathy moderates the effect 
of our experimental treatments, we interacted our treatment dummies with empathy and regressed 
preferences for the amount of immigration on the treatment dummies, empathy, and multiplicative 
terms. The results from this moderated regression analysis are presented in Figure 2 (and Table F2 
in Supplemental Appendix F).  
Consistent with H3, the results reveal that the decrease in support for restricting the amount 
of immigration into the U.S. for those in the humanitarian condition only occurred among 
respondents high in empathy. When empathy is at its minimum value, subjects receiving the 
humanitarian treatment did not significantly differ from those in the control condition in their 
preference for restricting immigration. However, the marginally significant coefficient for the 
                                                 
55 Lipsey 1990. 
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interaction term (B= -2.03, SE=1.55, p< .10), and the marginal effects plotted in Figure 2, indicate 
that the effect of receiving the humanitarian treatment significantly changes when moving from 
minimum to maximum levels of empathy, such that receiving the humanitarian treatment among 
those highest in empathy substantially decreases support for restrictive policy. In essence, this 
interaction confirms the theoretical intuition that providing information about the tribulations of 
immigrants would generate humanitarian concern, and consequently, policy permissiveness, only 
among citizens most able to empathize with the plight of others. In addition to supporting our 
hypothesis, this effect also provides some ex post facto validation of our humanitarian treatment. 
Presumably, the main effect of our humanitarian treatment is due to the activation of concern for 
others; these interactive results support this presumption by revealing that this treatment was 
effective only among individuals more likely empathizing with, and thus feeling concern for, the 
immigrants in the story56.  
While this effect is in line with theoretical expectations, our analysis uncovered a significant 
interaction between the threat treatment and empathy (B=3.39, SE=1.59, p<.05), depicted in Figure 
2, that was not theoretically anticipated. Interestingly, the results for this interaction indicate that our 
threat induction was most effective in augmenting opposition to immigration among those lowest in 
empathy. Then, we find a significant reversal in the marginal effect, where the provision of 
information intended to induce a sense of economic and cultural threat about immigration actually 
reduced opposition to immigration among those highest in empathy. At present, we can only 
speculate as to the process underlying this finding, but one distinct possibility is that the effect is 
being partly driven by an association between empathy and political orientations, such as 
                                                 
56 We should note that the significance of the interactions between our experimental treatment variables and empathy 
hold when re-estimated breaking the empathy scale into dummy variables for respondents in each quartile of the scale 
and interacting the treatment variables with each category dummy variable. That is, we find negative and significant 
interactions between the threat treatment and each successive empathy dummy³indicating a decreasing marginal effect 
of ³and a negative and  
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partisanship. Within our sample of white respondents, however, empathy and partisanship are only 
weakly correlated (r= -.19), with those highest in empathy manifesting a slight leaning toward being 
a Democrat. Despite having the benefit of random assignment to control for differences in 
partisanship across experimental groups, we re-ran the model interacting the treatments with 
empathy and included partisanship as a blocking factor. The results from this model revealed that 
the interaction between threat and empathy remained intact, suggesting that the observed effect is 
not simply due to empathy capturing the effects of partisanship. One remaining possibility, then, is 
that those high in empathy may react negatively to attempts to vilify others, specifically under-
privileged or vulnerable groups, such as immigrants. One last point to note is that, similar to Studies 
1 and 2 where individual differences in humanitarian did not influence policy attitudes differently for 
Democrats and Republicans, here, in running a moderated regression model where we interacted 
our treatment dummies with partisanship rather than empathy, we find that the effect of our 
humanitarian inducement did not vary across Democrats and Republicans.   
CONCLUSION 
 To date, scholars examining the determinants of immigration attitudes have focused 
exclusively on the negative³how factors such as threats, prejudice, and authoritarianism predict 
anti-immigrant sentiment. While undoubtedly crucial to our understanding of public opinion on 
immigration, this one-sided approach ignores the other half of the political debate, which centers on 
humanitarian concern for the plight of immigrants in their home countries. Analyzing three distinct 
datasets, we address this void in the literature by demonstrating that FRQFHUQIRUWKHZHOIDUHRIRQH·V
IHOORZKXPDQEHLQJVLVDVWURQJSUHGLFWRURIZKLWH$PHULFDQV·LPPLJUDWLRQSROLF\SUHIHUHQFHV. In 
Studies 1 through 3, we revealed that humanitarianism significantly increases opposition to policies 
aimed at reducing the amount of immigration, even after controlling for important variables such as 
partisanship, ideology, egalitarianism, prejudice, and a number of other demographic and 
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experiential factors. Additionally, in Studies 1 and 3, we extended these core findings by showing 
that humanitarianism provides a permissive benefit when it comes to policies concerning the 
provision of government services to immigrants, and that this effect is especially pronounced for 
allowing the children of illegal immigrants to attend public schools.  
Another novel contribution of our research is that we examined how different media 
environments, which were specifically designed to mimic the dominant arguments from pro- and 
anti-immigration groups, affect immigration attitudes. Utilizing a survey-embedded experiment, we 
showed that if the media were to highlight the plight of prospective immigrants, WKH´KHDY\KDQGµ
typically dealt immigrants by the public in many immigrant-receiving nations may be eased in favor 
of support for more permissive policies. Most interestingly, our research suggests that humanitarian 
appeals have the potential to mitigate opposition to immigration, even in the presence of 
countervailing threats. Last, our research highlights the relevance of empathy as a trait of central 
importance in shaping public reactions to immigration debates, as it was shown to enhance the 
effect of humanitarian information and undermine the effect of typical threat-based appeals. The 
strong moderating effect of empathy in the experiment highlights that we are truly dealing with a 
humanitarian response to immigrants not just a positive framing effect.  
One limitation of our research is that our results are based upon data solely from the U.S. 
While not necessarily representative of other immigrant-receiving nations, the U.S. is an attractive 
location to study the dynamics of opinion on immigration given the drastic and persistent influx of 
immigrants from Latin America into the country over the past few decades.  Indeed, future research 
could work to replicate the results from our studies using data from other high-profile immigrant-
receiving nations. Scholars could also extend our research by exploring additional bases for inducing 
humanitarian concern for immigrants, such as the difficulties they face living and working within 
their host countries. Last, future research could explore whether boundaries exist for the effect of 
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humanitarianism on opinion on immigration. Prior work finds that the impact of humanitarian 
concern on support for welfare programs has defined limits57, and that support for values in the 
abstract does not always translate to support for specific policies aimed at actualizing such values58. 
While this article demonstrates that humanitarian concern leads to support for immigrants, our 
analyses mostly focus on border permissiveness and policies concerning legal immigrants and 
children. One possible direction for future research could be to determine whether the permissive 
benefits of humanitarianism observed in this article extend to policies concerning undocumented 
workers, such as deportation and amnesty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
57 Feldman and Steenbergen 2001.  
58 e.g., McClosky and Zaller 1984.  
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Table 1. Humanitarianism and Immigration Policy Preferences  
(1996 ANES Post-Election Study) 
 
 Amount of 
Immigration 
Delay  
Welfare Benefits 
Humanitarianism 
 
-.750* (.363) -2.56*** (.702) 
Education  -1.33*** (.233) -.636 (.425) 
Income  .247 (.235) .348 (.432) 
Age  .001 (.003) .004 (.006) 
Gender  -.142 (.119) -.086 (.215) 
Unemployed  -.283 (.334) -.807 (.515) 
Pocketbook Evaluations  .723** (.258) .355 (.440) 
Ideology  .297 (.338) .522 (.621) 
Party ID  -.231 (.194) .569 (.368) 
Egalitarianism  -1.42*** (.321) -2.42*** (.590) 
Hispanic Affect  1.16*** (.329) .691 (.567) 
Religious Attendance  -.134 (.149) -.043 (.273) 
Constant  
  
4.54 (.886) 
Thresholds  
  
  
    Cut 1  -5.86 (.536)   
    Cut 2  -4.49 (.484)   
    Cut 3  -1.57 (.461)   
    Cut 4  -.179 (.458)   
N  1,207 1,207 
Effect Size  
 
  
ǻ Pr (Y=Max Value)  
due to ǻ Humanitarianism 
 
-.156 -.149 
Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from an ordered logistic regression. Reported effect sizes 
are based upon post-estimation analysis of predicted probabilities using CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg 2000) in Stata®.  Reported effects represent the change in the probability of selecting the 
highest category of each dependent variable associated with moving from 0 to 1 on the recoded 
Humanitarianism Scale. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Significant tests based upon two-tailed 
hypothesis tests.  
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Table 2. Humanitarianism and Support for Restricting the 
Amount of Immigration (2005 CID Survey) 
 
 
B (SE)  
Humanitarianism 
 
-.669* (.333)  
Education  -.798** (.298)  
Income  .312 (.358)  
Age  .620* (.311)  
Gender  -.185 (.144)  
Unemployed  -.414 (.294)  
Pocketbook Evaluations  1.07*** (.305)  
Ideology  1.28*** (.370)  
Party ID  .046 (.232)  
Egalitarianism  .226 (.241)  
National Identity  .304 (.462)  
Hispanic Affect  1.54*** (.394)  
Right-Wing Authoritarianism  1.73*** (.392)  
Immigrant Friends & Family  .296 (.228)  
Religious Attendance  .058 (.275)  
Thresholds  
  
 
    Cut 1  -.882 (.629)  
    Cut 2  .421 (.614)  
    Cut 3  2.47 (.620)  
    Cut 4  3.68 (.627)  
N  721  
Effect Size  
 
 
ǻ 3U< ´GHFUHDVHGDORWµ 
due to ǻ Humanitarianism 
 
-.142  
Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from an ordered logistic regression.  
The dependent variable is Amount of Immigration, coded so that highest category 
indicates support for decreasing the amount of immigration into the U.S. Reported 
effect sizes are based upon post-estimation analysis of predicted probabilities using 
CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) in Stata®.  Reported effect 
represents the change in the probability of preferring the amount of immigration be 
´GHFUHDVHGDORWµDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDWRFKDQJHLQ+XPDQLWDULDQLVPS
**p<.01, ***p<.001. Significant tests based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests. 
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Table 3.             Humanitarianism and Immigration Policy Preferences  
                                   (2012 NC Primary Election Statewide Survey) 
 
Amount of 
Immigration 
Delay  
Welfare Benefits 
Attend  
Public Schools 
Humanitarianism -2.31* (.975) -2.77** (.965) -4.41*** (.892) 
Education -.351 (.599) -1.65** (.585) -.516 (.535) 
Income .033 (.679) .883 (.673) -.322 (.590) 
Age .016 (.011)  (.010) .023* (.010) 
Gender -1.11** (.355) .056 (.343) .060 (.318) 
Ideology 1.13 (.890) .084 (.864)  (.820) 
Party ID 1.28 (.832) 2.18** (.815) 1.01 (.775) 
Egalitarianism 1.31 (.858)  (.831) -.227 (.798) 
Constant 
  
 
   
Thresholds 
  
 
   
    Cut 1 .212 (1.26) -1.51 (1.16) -3.48 (1.15) 
    Cut 2 2.70 (1.27) .184 (1.16) -1.99 (1.14) 
    Cut 3 
  
  -.554 (1.13) 
    Cut 4 
  
  .942 (1.13) 
N 194 195 195 
Effect Size 
 
 
 
ǻ Pr (Y=Max Value) 
due to ǻ Humanitarianism -.473 -.576 -.629 
Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from logistic and ordered logistic regressions. Results based 
upon 196 non-Hispanic white survey respondents in the control condition of the survey experiment that 
answered the quality control question correctly. Reported effect sizes are based upon post-estimation 
analysis of predicted probabilities using CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) in Stata®.  Reported 
effects represent the change in the probability of selecting the highest category of each dependent variable 
associated with moving from 0 to 1 on the recoded Humanitarianism 6FDOHSS05, **p<.01, 
p<.001. Significance tests based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests. 
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Figure 1. Support for Restrictive Immigration Policy by Experimental Condition 
 
 
Notes: Plotted effects are based upon post-estimation analysis of predicted probabilities with 90% confidence intervals 
using CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) in Stata®. N = 616.
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Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Experimental Treatments on Immigration Policy Preferences across Levels of Empathy 
 
 
Notes: Plotted estimates (with 90% confidence intervals) reflect the conditional marginal effects (of moving from the control to the treatment condition) on the 
probability of favoring a reduction in the amount of immigration into the U.S. N = 615.
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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX A1 
Question Wording from 1996 ANES Post-Election Study 
 
Note: Labels in parentheses are the label of each variable as appears in the ANES survey. 
 
Humanitarianism 
This measure is comprised of the following four items. Respondents were asked to report their level 
of agreement with each statement, with the response options ranging from: (´$JUHH6WURQJO\µ
´$JUHH6RPHZKDWµ´1HLWKHU$JUHHRU'LVDJUHHµ´'LVDJUHH6RPHZKDWµ´'LVDJUHH
6WURQJO\µ These items were combined into a scale, with an Į=.6008, and coded to range from low 
to high levels of humanitarianism.   
 
1. ´2QHVKRXOGDOZD\VILQGZD\VWRKHOSRWKHUVOHVVIRUWXQDWHWKDQRQHVHOIµ(V961235). 
2. ´$SHUVRQVKRXOGDOZD\VEHFRQFHUQHGDERXWWKHZHOO-EHLQJRIRWKHUVµ (V961236). 
3. ´It is best not to get too involved in taking care of other people's needsµ (V961237). 
4. ´People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of RWKHUVWKDQWKH\VKRXOGµ (V961238). 
 
Egalitarianism 
This measure is comprised of the following five items. Respondents were asked to report their level 
of agreement with each statement, with the response options ranJLQJIURP´$JUHH6WURQJO\µ
´$JUHH6RPHZKDWµ´1HLWKHU$JUHHRU'LVDJUHHµ´'LVDJUHH6RPHZKDWµ´'LVDJUHH
6WURQJO\µ7KHVHLWHPVZHUHFRPELQHGLQWRDVFDOHZLWKĮ=.6774, and coded to range from low to 
high levels of egalitarianism. 
 
1. ´2XU society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal 
RSSRUWXQLW\WRVXFFHHGµ(V961229). 
2. ´We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this countryµ(V961230). 
3. ´One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chanceµ 
(V961231) 
4. ´This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people areµ 
(V961232). 
5. ´If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problemsµ 
(V961233). 
 
Education 
Respondents were asked to list the highest grade in school or year of college completed (V960610). 
Item has 8 response options, ranging from (1)-´JUDGHVRUOHVVRUQRGLSORPDµWR-´DGYDQFHG
degree.µ 
 
Income 
Respondents were asked to report their own personal income, excluding any income received by a 
spouse or other family members (V960702). The response options for this item range from (1)-
´1RQHRUOHVVWKDQµWR-´RUPRUH.µ 
 
Age 
                                                 
1 To be published online in the event of publication 
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Respondents were asked to report the month, day, and year of their birth (V960605). This item was 
used to calculate respondents' age.  
 
Gender 
A dichotomous item for which female respondents served as the baseline category. 
 
Unemployed 
$GLFKRWRPRXVLWHPFRGHG´µLIUHVSRQGHQWVUHSRUWHGEHLQJODLG-off or temporarily unemployed, 
DQG´µRWKHUZLVHV960616). 
 
Pocketbook Evaluations 
Respondents were asked: ´What do you think of your personal financial situation 
these days?µ5HVSRQVHRSWLRQVIRUWKLVLWHPUDQJHGIURP-´YHU\JRRGµWR-´YHU\EDGµ 
 
Ideology 
Respondents were asked to locate themselves on a 7 point liberal-conservative scale, ranging from 
(1)-´([WUHPHO\OLEHUDOµWR-´([WUHPHO\FRQVHUYDWLYHµ(V960365).  
 
Party ID 
Standard 7-point party identification scale, ranging from (1)-´6WURQJ'HPRFUDWµWR-
´,QGHSHQGHQWµWR-´6WURQJ5HSXEOLFDQµV960420). 
 
Hispanic Affect 
5HVSRQGHQWVZHUHSUHVHQWHGZLWKWKHIROORZLQJLWHP´I'd like you to rate [Hispanics] using 
something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that 
you feel favorable and warm toward [Hispanics]. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean 
that you don't feel favorable toward [Hispanics] and that you don't care too much for [Hispanics]. 
You would rate [Hispanics] at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particular warm or cold toward 
>+LVSDQLFV@µ (V961037). From this item, we created a variable that was reverse coded to range from 
positive to negative feelings toward Hispanics. 
 
Religious Attendance  
Respondents were asked to report how often they attend religious services, ranging from (1)-´(YHU\
ZHHNµWR-´1HYHUµV960578).  This item was reverse coded to range from low to high religious 
attendance.  
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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX B 
Question Wording from 2005 Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy Survey 
 
Note: Labels in parentheses are the name of each variable as appears in the CID survey. 
 
Education 
Respondents were asked to list the highest grade in school or year of college completed (EDUC). 
Item has 8 response options, ranging from (1)-´1RQHRUJUDGH-µ to (8)-´3RVW-graduate 
WUDLQLQJSURIHVVLRQDOVFKRROLQJDIWHUFROOHJHµ 
 
Income 
The measure of respondent income was based upon a corrected and adjusted constructed income 
VFDOHFRQWDLQHGLQWKH&,',1&20(&PHDVXULQJUHVSRQGHQWV·WRWDODQQXDOQHWKRXVHhold 
income.  This ordinal item has 11 categories, ranging from (1)-´/HVVWKDQµWR-
´RUPRUHµ 
 
Age 
Respondents were asked how old they were (AGE). Mean age was 45. When recoded to range from 
0 to 1, mean age is .37.  
 
Employment Status 
7KLVLVDGLFKRWRPRXVLWHPZLWKXQHPSOR\HGUHVSRQGHQWVFRGHG´µDQGDOORWKHUVFRGHG´µ
5HVSRQGHQWVFODVVLILHGDVXQHPSOR\HGZHUHWKRVHZKRUHSRUWHGEHLQJ´XQHPSOR\HGDQGDFWLYHO\
ORRNLQJIRUDMREµDQGRU´XQHPSOR\HGZDQWLQJDMREEXWQRWDFWLYHO\ ORRNLQJIRUDMREµ%DVHGRQ
items (UEMPLA) and (UEMPLI). 
 
Pocketbook Economic Evaluations 
Respondents were asked to select among provided statements which come closest to how they feel 
DERXWWKHLUKRXVHKROG·VLQFRPHDWWKHWLPHRILQWHUYLHZ+,1&)(/7his ordinal item has 4 
response options, ranging from (1)-´/LYLQJFRPIRUWDEO\RQSUHVHQWLQFRPHµ-´&RSLQJRQSUHVHQW
LQFRPHµ-´)LQGLQJLWGLIILFXOWRQSUHVHQWLQFRPHµ-´)LQGLQJLWYHU\GLIILFXOWRQSUHVHQW
LQFRPHµ 
 
Party Identification 
Standard 7 point scale pre-constructed by CID (PARTYID). This variable was recoded to range 
IURP´6WURQJ'HPRFUDWµWR´6WURQJ5HSXEOLFDQµ 
 
Ideology 
5HVSRQGHQWVZHUHSUHVHQWHGZLWKWKHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQ/56&$/(´:HKHDUDORWRIWDONWKHVH
days about liberalVDQGFRQVHUYDWLYHV:KHUHGR\RXIDOO"µ5HVSRQGHQWVZHUHJLYHQUHVSRQVH
options, ranging from (0)-´OLEHUDOµWR-´FRQVHUYDWLYHµ 
 
Hispanic Affect 
8VLQJDVFDOHRI´OLNLQJDQGGLVOLNLQJµUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHGWRVWDWHKRZWKH\IHOWDERXW
´+LVSDQLF SHRSOHµ$+,637KLVLWHPKDVRUGHUHGUHVSRQVHRSWLRQVUDQJLQJIURP-´'LVOLNHD
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*UHDW'HDOµ-´'LVOLNHµ-´8QFHUWDLQµ-´/LNHµ-´/LNHD*UHDW'HDOµ7KLVLWHPZDV
UHFRGHGWRUDQJHIURP´/LNHD*UHDW'HDOµWR´'LVOLNHD*UHDW'HDOµ 
 
National Identity 
Pre-constructed scale in CID (NATPRIDE).  Based on an item asking respondents how proud it 
makes them to be called an American (NATIO1), and an item asking soliciting agreement or 
GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHVWDWHPHQW´%HLQJDQ$PHULFDQLVDYHU\ LPSRUWDQWSDUWRIKRZ,VHHP\VHOIµ
(NATIO2). The constructed scale is coded to range from low to high strength of national identity. 
 
Right Wing Authoritarianism  
This scale was created from a set of survey items closely approximating standard measures of right 
wing authoritarianism.  A summative scale was created from the following items in the survey: 
(ORDER1), (ORDER2), (ORDER3), (CHILDA2), (CHILDA3), (AUTHOR3), (AUTHOR4), 
'2*'2*'2*'2*DQG'2*7KH&URQEDFN·VDOSKDIRUWKLVVFDOH=.775. 
 
Immigrant Friends & Family 
5HVSRQGHQWVZHUHDVNHGZKHWKHURUQRWWKH\KDGDQ\FORVHIULHQGVZKRDUH´5HFHQWLPPLJUDQWVWR
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWKRVHZKRKDYHEHHQLQWKHFRXQWU\IRUOHVVWKDQ\HDUVµ&/2&+$57KLV
item is dichotomous, and was recoded so that (1)-´<HVµDQG-´1Rµ 
 
Religious Attendance 
Respondents were asked: "Apart from special occasions such as weddings or funerals, about how 
often to you attend religious services nowadays?" (RLGATND). This item has 7 ordered response 
options, ranging from (1)-"every day" to (7)-"never."  We recoded this item to range from low to 
high religious attendance.  
 
Economic Threat 
Respondents were asked to report their level of agreement with the statement: "Most people who 
come to live in the U.S. work, pay taxes, and use health and social services. Do you think people 
who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?" (IMBLECO). 
Response options ranged from (0)-"Generally take out more" to (10)-"Generally put in more."  The 
variable created from this item was reverse coded to range from low to high perceived economic 
threat.  
 
Cultural Threat 
Respondents were asked: "Would you say that America's cultural life is generally undermined or 
enhanced by people coming to live here from other countries?" (IMUECLT). Response options 
ranged from (0)-"Cultural life undermined" to (10)-"Cultural life enhanced." The variable created 
from this item was reverse coded to range from low to high perceived cultural threat.  
 
Crime Threat 
Respondents were asked: "Do you think America's crime problems are made worse or better by 
people coming to live here from other countries?" (IMWBCRM). Response options ranged from 
(0)-"Made worse" to (10)-"Made better." The variable created from this item was reverse coded to 
range from low to high perceived crime threat. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX C 
2005 CID Additional Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C1.        Humanitarianism and the Perceived Impacts of Immigration  
                                                         (2005 CID Survey) 
 
Economic Threat Cultural Threat Crime Threat 
Humanitarianism -.094* (.039) -.116** (.038) -.065 (.034) 
Education - (.035) -.206*** (.034) -.084** (.031) 
Income .015 (.042) .059 (.041) -.015 (.037) 
Age .007 (.036) -.004 (.035) -.010 (.031) 
Gender -.011 (.017) .010 (.016) .007 (.015) 
Unemployed .011 (.034) -.010 (.034) -.034 (.030) 
Pocketbook Evaluations .080* (.035) .121*** (.034) .018 (.031) 
Ideology .139*** (.043) .134*** (.042) .069 (.037) 
Party ID -.009 (.026)  (.026) -.010 (.023) 
Egalitarianism .028 (.028) .022 (.027) .012 (.024) 
National Identity .116* (.052) .036 (.051) .118* (.046) 
Hispanic Affect .188*** (.045) .148*** (.044) .228*** (.039) 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism .257*** (.044) .180*** (.043) .143*** (.039) 
Immigrant Friends & Family .034 (.026) .008 (.026) .018 (.023) 
Religious Attendance  -.067* (.032) -.002 (.031) -.003 (.028) 
Constant .232 (.072) .201 (.071) .358 (.064) 
 Adj. R² .179 .216 .148 
N 721 721 721 
Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from OLS regression modelsSSSS6LJQLILFDQFH
tests based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX D 
Question Wording from 2012 NC Primary Election Survey 
 
For the following three scales, respondents indicated the degree to which they agreed or disagreed 
with the items listed below UDQJLQJIURP´6WURQJO\'LVDJUHHµWR´6WURQJO\$JUHHµ´1HLWKHUµ
served as the neutral midpoint). Items were presented in random order. Reverse-worded statements 
LGHQWLILHGE\WKHOHWWHU´5µ 
 
Humanitarianism 
1. ´One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself.µ 
2. ´7KHGLJQLW\DQGZHOIDUHRISHRSOHVKRXOGEHWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWFRQFHUQLQDQ\
VRFLHW\µ 
3. ´$OOSHRSOHZKRDUHXQDEOHWRSURYLGHIRUWKHLUEDVLFQHHGVVKRXOGEHKHOSHGE\RWKHUVµ 
4. ´2QHRIWKHSUREOHPVRIWRGD\
VVRFLHW\LVWKDWZHDUHRIWHQWRRNLQGWRSHRSOHZKR
GRQ
WGHVHUYHLWµ (R) 
5. ´$SHUVRQVKRXOGDOZD\VEHFRQFHUQHGDERXWWKHZHOO-being of othersµ 
6. ´,WLVEHWWHUQRWWREHWRRNLQGWRSHRSOHEHFDXVHNLQGQHVVZLOORQO\EHDEXVHGµ (R) 
7. ´3HRSOHWHQGWRSD\PRUHDWWHQWLRQWRWKHZHOO-EHLQJRIRWKHUVWKDQWKH\VKRXOGµ (R) 
8. ´,EHOLHYHLWLVEHVWQRWWRJHWLQYROYHGWDNLQJFDUHRIRWKHUSHRSOH
VQHHGVµ (R) 
 
Empathy 
1. ´I find it easy to put myself in somebody else's shoes.µ 
2. ´,DPTXLFNWRVSRWZKHQVRPHRQHLQDJURXSLVIHHOLQJDZNZDUGRUXQFRPIRUWDEOHµ 
3. ´Other people tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling and what they 
DUHWKLQNLQJµ 
4. ´I am 127JRRGDWSUHGLFWLQJKRZVRPHRQHZLOOIHHOµ (R) 
5. ´,WLVKDUGIRUPHWRVHHZK\VRPHWKLQJVXSVHWSHRSOHVRPXFKµ (R) 
 
Egalitarianism 
1. ´If wealth were more equal in this country we would have many fewer problems.µ 
2. ´,QFRPHVVKRXOGEHPRUHHTXDOEHFDXVHHYery family's needs for food, housing, and so 
RQDUHWKHVDPHµ 
3. ´:HKDYHJRQHWRRIDULQSXVKLQJHTXDOLW\LQWKLVFRXQWU\µ (R) 
4. ´7KLVFRXQWU\ZRXOGEHEHWWHURIILIZHZRUULHGOHVVDERXWKRZHTXDOSHRSOHDUHµ (R) 
 
Education 
Respondents were asked to list the highest level of education that they had completed. Item has 6 
response options, ranging from (1)-´'LGQRWILQLVK+LJK6FKRRO1R*('µ to (6)-´Graduate 
Degree.µ 
 
Income 
IQFRPHZDVEDVHGXSRQUHVSRQGHQWV·WRWDODQQXDOKRXVHKROGLncome.  This ordinal item has 7 
categories, ranging from (1)-´8QGHUµWR-´2YHUµwith increments of $25,000. 
 
Age 
Respondents stated the year in which they were born, which we used this date to determine each 
UHVSRQGHQW·VDJH  
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Gender 
A dichotomous item for which female respondents served as the baseline category. 
 
Party Identification 
A standard 5-SRLQWVFDOHUHFRGHGWRUDQJHIURP´6WURQJ'HPRFUDWµWR´6WURQJ5HSXEOLFDQµ 
 
Ideology 
A standard 5-point scale recoded to range from ´/LEHUDOµWR´&onservative.µ  
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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX E 
Stimulus Materials for Survey Experiment 
 
Introduction³All Conditions (48 words, excluding title and date) 
 
HONDURANS TO IMMIGRATE TO NORTH CAROLINA 
 
April 9, 2012 - Raleigh, NC ² In collaboration with local law enforcement and other state agencies, the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office has drafted a plan to begin allowing hundreds of Hondurans 
to immigrate to North Carolina. Honduras is a republic in Central America with an estimated population of 
almost eight million people. 
 
 
Threat Condition (88 words) 
A report from the non-partisan Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) noted that these Honduran immigrants 
will require a wide range of tax-payer funded state services to help them begin their new lives in North 
Carolina. The report also indicated that the influx of Hondurans may increase competition for jobs in various 
sectors of the economy. Finally, the CIS report stated that these immigrants have limited English-language 
ability and exposure to American culture, so it is very likely they will take some time to fully assimilate into 
the U.S. 
 
 
Humanitarianism Condition (103 words) 
A report from the non-partisan Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) noted that the purpose of the plan is to 
help these Honduran immigrants escape extremely harsh and unsafe conditions in their home country. Nearly 
two-thirds of the Honduran population live below the poverty line and have limited access to clean drinking 
water, food, and employment. The Honduran government is also known for brutally repressing its citizens, 
whose rights are routinely violated by excessive use of police force that often ends in fatalities. In short, the 
CIS report suggests that poverty and government repression threaten the lives of many Hondurans simply 
trying to survive. 
 
 
Combined Condition (Threat and Humanitarianism; 186 words) 
A report from the non-partisan Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) noted that these Honduran immigrants 
will require a wide range of tax-payer funded state services to help them begin their new lives in North 
Carolina. The report also indicated that the influx of Hondurans may increase competition for jobs in various 
sectors of the economy. Finally, the CIS report stated that these immigrants have limited English-language 
ability and exposure to American culture, so it is very likely they will take some time to fully assimilate into 
the U.S. 
 
Yet, the CIS report also noted that the purpose of the plan is to help these Honduran immigrants escape 
extremely harsh and unsafe conditions in their home country. Nearly two-thirds of the Honduran population 
live below the poverty line and have limited access to clean drinking water, food, and employment. The 
Honduran government is also known for brutally repressing its citizens, whose rights are routinely violated by 
excessive use of police force that often ends in fatalities. In short, the CIS report suggests that poverty and 
government repression threaten the lives of many Hondurans simply trying to survive. 
 
 
Control Condition (42 words) 
The climate is generally pleasant and temperate, with dry and wet seasons. The terrain includes mountainous 
areas, coastal beaches, and jungle lowlands. It is notable for its production of minerals, tropical fruit, and 
recently for exportation of clothing for the international market. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX F 
Regression Results for Figures 1 and 2 
 
Table F1.    Effects of Experimental Treatments On      
                     Support for Restrictive Policy 
                   (2012 NC Primary Election Statewide Survey) 
 
B (SE) 
Threat Condition  (.229) 
Humanitarian Condition -.481* (.224) 
Combined Condition  -.385* (.221) 
Thresholds 
      Cut 1 -2.45 (.199) 
    Cut 2 -.266 (.161) 
N 616 
Effect Sizes 
 ǻ 3U< ´GHFUHDVHGµGXHWR 
 
    ǻ ControlÆThreat .081 
    ǻ ControlÆHumanitarian -.120 
    ǻ ControlÆCombined -.098 
Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from an ordered logistic regression.  
The dependent variable is Amount of Immigration, coded so that highest category 
indicates support for decreasing the amount of immigration into the U.S. Reported 
effect sizes are based upon post-estimation analysis of predicted probabilities using 
CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) in Stata®.  Reported effect represents 
WKHFKDQJHLQWKHSUREDELOLW\RISUHIHUULQJWKHDPRXQWRILPPLJUDWLRQEH´GHFUHDVHGµ
associated with moving from the control group to each respective experimental 
FRQGLWLRQSSSS6LJQLILFDQWWHVWVEDVHGXSRQRQH-tailed 
hypothesis tests. 
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Table F2.   Effects of Experimental Treatments by 
                    Empathy on Immigration Policy Preferences 
                    (2012 NC Primary Election Statewide Survey) 
 
 B (SE)  
Treatment Condition 
 
   
Threat 
 
2.580** (1.060)  
Humanitarianism  .791 (.999)  
Combined  .161 (..988)  
Moderator     
Empathy  -.660 (1.098)  
Interactions     
Threat X Empathy  -3.393* (1.598)  
Humanitarianism X 
Empathy 
 
-2.027 (1.559)  
Combined X Empathy  -.866 (1.542)  
     
Thresholds  
  
 
    Cut 1  -2.890 (.716)  
    Cut 2  -.659 (.704)  
N  615 
   
Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficients from an ordered logistic regression. 
SSS***p<.001. Significance tests based upon one-tailed 
hypothesis tests. 
 
